Situation assessment

Over the past 72 hours, the region has been in a highly sensitive phase in which indicators of military escalation intersect with faltering diplomatic efforts. On the Iran file, reports circulated about a limited U.S. strike on Qeshm Island, the downing of a sixth U.S. drone over the island, and two oil tankers hitting mines east of the Strait of Hormuz, while reports spoke of U.S.-Israeli plans for a short and intensive strike on targets in Iran that could include energy infrastructure, and of a U.S. military buildup with three aircraft carriers. In contrast, Washington denied immediate plans for a new attack, and reports indicated that the chances of war declined after the Republican defeat in the midterm elections, and that Tehran is reviewing mediators’ proposals on its nuclear program and has sent a nuclear proposal to Washington via Qatar, while insisting on seven conditions before reopening the Strait of Hormuz. In Israel, government formation is advancing after the elections, as party recommendations showed Gadi Eisenkot ahead of Benjamin Netanyahu, with talk of a national emergency government, while Tel Aviv faces the repercussions of President Donald Trump’s announcement of suspending military aid and Vice President JD Vance’s remarks linking the Republican loss to the war on Iran. On the Lebanese front, Israeli attacks continue in the south, with an official toll of 4,390 killed and 12,429 wounded from March 2 to November 5; Israeli forces infiltrate Zawtar al-Gharbiyya and Wadi Shebaa; and the Israeli army announces finding more than 340 combat means belonging to Hezbollah in the Shaqif heights and the Litani area. Sensitive internal files continue regarding the state’s monopoly on weapons and the Dahr al-Baydar explosives case, Lebanese-Israeli negotiations are frozen, and UNIFIL’s mandate approaches its end on December 31, 2026. In Syria, Israeli-Syrian confrontation expands with strikes on Abu al-Duhur airport, an incursion in the Quneitra countryside, and shelling of Beit Jinn; Netanyahu’s office rejects the deployment of Turkish forces at a base near Aleppo; and Damascus announced foiling a Hezbollah cell that was targeting the Homs refinery. In Palestine, Israeli military operations continue in Gaza and the West Bank, with assassinations in Khan Younis and central Gaza, settlers storming homes near Jericho, and Tony Blair visiting Israel as part of attempts to revive Trump’s Gaza plan, amid talk of an evacuation decision threatening to ignite a confrontation; the Palestinian vice president welcomed working with any Israeli government that respects the rights of the Palestinian people.

The most prominent connecting thread is that the U.S. midterm elections have rearranged the calculations of confrontation with Iran: on one hand, they deepened divisions within the Trump administration and pushed toward reducing the chances of an all-out war, as shown by Vance’s remarks and regional-source assessments; on the other hand, they did not cancel the military option, as reports speak of CENTCOM plans and Israeli pressure to return to targeting Iran. Tehran is exploiting this moment by sending a nuclear proposal via Qatar and linking the opening of Hormuz to seven conditions, while at the same time deepening cooperation with Russia; Washington is trying to keep two tracks: limited military pressure and negotiation. This tension directly affects Israel, where a crisis of confidence with Washington, represented by the aid suspension and Vance’s remarks, intersects with a sensitive domestic deadline after the elections, namely the formation of a government likely led by Eisenkot, which may change the tone of war management but does not remove security pressures. In Lebanon, the Iran file becomes an hour of pressure: Hezbollah wants to keep its participation decision hanging on the size of the U.S./Israeli strike on Iran, and Israel threatens that any field support will lead to comprehensive targeting, with scenarios including the occupation of southern cities and a naval blockade. In contrast, there is information that Hezbollah has pledged not to engage in a future war alongside Iran, but sources doubt this and link the decision to the Revolutionary Guards’ calculations. The Lebanese government and the president are trying to consolidate positive neutrality and the state’s monopoly on weapons, while five Western embassies support the state’s monopoly on weapons and call for an independent judiciary in the Dahr al-Baydar case, against the backdrop of a Hezbollah delegation’s visit to the Palace of Justice and its statement that the explosives belong to the party. This makes Lebanon a testing ground for internal and regional balances, especially with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s warning against dragging Lebanon into adventures serving foreign interests. As for Syria, it is witnessing overlapping tracks: Israel strikes sites, infiltrates Quneitra, and rejects Turkish deployment near Aleppo; Damascus is trying to move toward regional settlements through Riyadh and the Makkah alliance; at the same time, it announces foiling a Hezbollah cell, which indicates a desire to reduce its connection to the Iranian axis or at least to display security independence. In Palestine, Israeli operations in Gaza continue despite talk of the Trump plan and Blair’s efforts, while the settlers’ incursion near Jericho reflects pressure on the Israeli army and keeps the West Bank an open front, especially with an admission from within the Israeli army that it has not succeeded in stopping violence in the West Bank. Thus the crises overlap: a war on Iran could activate the Lebanese, Syrian, and Gaza fronts, but it could also push toward rapid regional settlements under U.S. and Israeli electoral pressure.

Probable scenarios for the coming period: the most likely scenario, according to the data, is continued limited military pressure and threats of the military option, while keeping indirect diplomatic channels via Qatar and Russia open, with the chances of an immediate all-out war declining but not being ruled out. In this framework, limited strikes on Iranian targets may resume or the covert war may suffice, while Israeli operations continue in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. The second scenario is broad escalation if Washington or Israel decides to carry out a large strike on Iran, which may push Hezbollah to participate after two or three days and lead to a wide Israeli war in Lebanon, including scenarios of Tyre, Sidon, and Nabatieh and a naval blockade, and repercussions in Syria and other fronts. The third scenario is consolidating calm through a partial nuclear or security deal after the U.S. elections and the formation of the Israeli government, while tension remains on the sub-fronts. In all cases, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine will remain arenas where Iranian, Israeli, and U.S. calculations intersect, and all will be affected by the course of U.S.-Israeli relations and Tehran’s ability to maneuver.