Israel Between Domestic Political Transition and US Strategic Pressure: Government Formation and Preparations for Iran
Bottom line
The key point the reader should know is that Israel is simultaneously facing an unsettled domestic political transition and a decline in US partisan cover, while its military continues preparing for a possible confrontation with Iran and Hezbollah. This intersection means that the identity of the next government and the nature of its relationship with Washington will largely determine whether Israel acts with escalation or restraint, and that military preparations alone are not proof that war is imminent.
Current situation
Reports indicate that Israel has entered a phase of political transition after the recent elections. President Isaac Herzog's consultations ended with Gideon Sa'ar? No, with Gadi Eisenkot receiving 67 recommendations against 46 for Benjamin Netanyahu, and Herzog said he will announce on Sunday the tasking of the candidate to form the government. This advance is reinforced by the United Torah Judaism party's abstention from recommending any candidate over a dispute about the law exempting Haredi students from military service, and by recommendations reaching Eisenkot from parties including Ra'am and opposition camps, while Eisenkot speaks of forming a national emergency government and taking legislative action in the Knesset. At the same time, Netanyahu's trial continues, and Yair Lapid's statements about an attempt to crush democracy and steal the election add political tension. Externally, the Republican losses in the US midterm elections and Vice President JD Vance's statements linking the war on Iran to Republican losses have raised Israeli concerns about declining US support, while reports indicate Trump announced a halt to military and financial aid and its impact on a $10 billion arms bill. On security, the Israeli army continues preparations for scenarios of confrontation with Iran and Hezbollah, including converting hospital parking lots into emergency departments, opening shelters, and holding Home Front drills, alongside reports of Israeli intelligence about Iranian chemical weapons that Tehran denied, and US military buildups in the region. The army also announced the introduction of combat robotic systems in southern Lebanon, amid continued operations and directives to accelerate their integration.
Analysis
The picture reflects not only a government-formation crisis but an intersection of domestic political crisis and US strategic pressure. Netanyahu emerges electorally weaker in numbers but seeks to retain leadership by pressing Washington and linking Israeli security to the war on Iran, while Eisenkot appears closest to being tasked but faces a complex calculation: possible outside Arab support that raises Likud reservations, a Haredi condition on conscription, likely refusal to include Ben-Gvir, and pressure from Lapid to form a government quickly. At the same time, the continuation of Netanyahu's trial and Lapid's statements about 'stealing the election' indicate that the struggle over legitimacy will accompany coalition negotiations. On the US front, Republican losses and Vance's talk of reviewing relations with Israel reveal that close association with Netanyahu has become an electoral cost in Washington and may narrow the margin for military and financial support. Reports of an aid halt and Israeli advertising campaigns in the United States reflect Israeli concern about eroding US partisan cover. On security, accelerated Israeli preparations toward Iran and Hezbollah do not necessarily mean war is imminent, but they are being used to manage risk and pressure Washington; divisions within the US administration over escalation reduce the likelihood of a coordinated strike without eliminating a unilateral Israeli option. In Lebanon, introducing robotic systems reflects continued tactical operations and evolving combat tools rather than a definitive indicator of a wide war.
Outlook
Based on the data, the most likely scenario is that Herzog tasks Eisenkot on Sunday, but his success in forming a government able to win Knesset confidence remains uncertain because of the Haredi and Arab calculations and disputes over Ben-Gvir and judicial legislation. If formation fails, Israel may enter a longer deadlock and move toward early elections, while Netanyahu continues to use legal, political, and security positions for leverage. Externally, the US aid file and coordination on Iran are likely to remain a focus of tension, with possible review of military and financial support rather than a complete rupture, especially given Israeli talk of independent capabilities. On security, preparations for all scenarios will continue; a strike on Iran remains possible if Washington gives a green light or if Israel decides to act alone, but US internal divisions and Israel's political transition reduce the likelihood of a wide escalation in the near term. The Hezbollah front will most likely remain within calculated and limited operations.