Lebanon Between the Prospect of an Iran War and Disarmament Pressure: Southern Escalation and the Post-UNIFIL Phase
Bottom line
The most important point for the reader is that Lebanon is in a dangerous waiting period tied on one hand to the timing of confrontation with Iran and on the other to the fate of security arrangements south of the Litani after UNIFIL. The current Israeli escalation is not limited to field pressure; it aims to influence Hezbollah’s decision-making and the internal weapons equation. At the same time, the collision between the logic of the state and the monopoly on arms and the logic of the resistance, especially in the Dahr al-Baydar file, means that any judicial or security development internally could trigger a major crisis. The bottom line is that the primary danger is not an inevitable all-out war, but gradual slippage through incremental escalation, the security vacuum and internal collision, while Lebanon remains hostage to regional calculations it does not control.
Current situation
The news reflects a complex security and political situation. The Ministry of Health announced that the toll of Israeli operations from 2 March to 5 November rose to 4,390 killed and 12,429 wounded, while field escalation continues in the south through limited incursions, machine-gun sweeping, intensive drone overflights, and shelling, demolition and burning of homes in several towns including Zawtar, Braasheet, Kafr Tibnit, Khiam and Haddatha. The Israeli army announced the discovery of more than 340 weapons belonging to Hezbollah in the Shaqif heights and the Litani area. Domestically, the embassies of the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada and Japan expressed support for the state’s monopoly on arms and for an independent judiciary in the Dahr al-Baydar file, while a Hezbollah delegation visited the Prosecutor General and informed him that the seized explosives belong to the party for resistance purposes, warning that any conviction would amount to cutting off the hand of the resistance. While President Joseph Aoun stressed that positive neutrality is a necessity, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam warned against dragging Lebanon into adventures serving foreign interests. The negotiation crisis with Israel continues amid American ambiguity and Israeli pressure to move to direct military-to-military communication, with UNIFIL’s mandate ending on 31 December 2026 and its downsizing and withdrawal beginning thereafter. Judicially and economically, the files of former Central Bank Governor Riad Salameh, the Central Bank, deposits and the 2027 budget developed, while the Syrian refugee file remained without decisive Syrian responses.
Analysis
The Israeli escalation in the south appears to go beyond a tactical response: it combines weakening Hezbollah’s field capabilities by dismantling structures and movements with raising the cost of any decision to participate in a confrontation linked to Iran. These operations align with Israeli messages about wider scenarios if Hezbollah intervenes, including broad strikes, a naval blockade and options to occupy southern areas, messages intended to pressure both Hezbollah’s decision-making and the Lebanese authorities. Hezbollah, for its part, is trying to preserve the resistance’s position and room for maneuver: it publicly affirms that the decision is Lebanese and signals that it will not engage in a new support war, but at the same time rejects referring the weapons and explosives file to the judiciary and sees any conviction as targeting the resistance. This contradiction between the logic of the state and the monopoly on arms and the logic of the resistance makes the Dahr al-Baydar file a political and security test that goes beyond the judiciary. The state, through the discourse of positive neutrality and sovereignty, is trying to spare Lebanon regional conflicts, but its ability to impose this discourse remains limited amid negotiating stagnation, American ambiguity and Israeli pressure to bypass the mechanism committee. The anticipated UNIFIL withdrawal adds another layer of risk, as it may create a security vacuum that pushes toward direct confrontation between the Lebanese and Israeli armies or gives Israel a pretext to impose a buffer zone. Internal governance files, including the prosecution of Riad Salameh and financial entitlements, reflect judicial activity but do not address economic and social fragility. The Israeli narrative about finding weapons and Hezbollah plans remains a factor in building justification for continuing operations, while press information about plans to kidnap ministers and target the army remains officially unconfirmed but reflects a high level of tension.
Outlook
Based on current data, the most likely scenario is continued gradual Israeli pressure in the south through strikes, drones, limited incursions and demolition operations, without an immediate transition to all-out war, as long as an Iran strike is not realized or Hezbollah has not decided to intervene. However, if Iran is struck and Hezbollah chooses field support, the news indicates the possibility of a broad Israeli response of unguaranteed scope in Lebanon, potentially including the southern suburbs, civilian and military infrastructure, and options of blockade or limited occupation. If Hezbollah chooses not to intervene, Israel is likely to keep security pressure high to impose a disarmament equation or modify southern arrangements. Politically, negotiations are likely to remain frozen until the American picture becomes clear after the elections, with continued disagreement over the military communication mechanism. As UNIFIL’s mandate nears its end, the possibility of direct confrontation between the two armies or the imposition of a new security reality south of the Litani increases. Domestically, the Dahr al-Baydar file and weapons issues may see escalation if judicial decisions are issued against Hezbollah figures, while economic and deposits files remain without decisive solutions.