Situation assessment

The region is in a transitional phase between a 'no war, no peace' state and the prospect of wide escalation. In Iran, signs of US military readiness intersect with Gulf warnings of a 'short but intense' campaign, and with disclosed plans that could target leadership, energy facilities and the nuclear programme; sources speak of US forces able to act within 96 hours of an order, and of operations costing more than $47 billion. In parallel, Qatari, Saudi, Egyptian and Pakistani mediation is active to revive a track allowing inspectors' return in exchange for sanctions relief, while Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi says Tehran is giving diplomacy a real chance and President Masoud Pezeshkian stresses a desire to end the 'no war, no peace' state. In Israel, the 26th Knesset election remains unresolved, with Benjamin Netanyahu's bloc and Gadi Eisenkot's camp close, an unprecedented rise of Arab parties to about 19 seats, and legal and political debate over whether a caretaker government may decide on war with Iran. Lebanon faces mounting US pressure over Hezbollah, the Dahieh explosives file and threats of sanctions, with President Joseph Aoun insisting on keeping UNIFIL or a European alternative before its operations end on 31 December 2026, and Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem declaring that the resistance continues and that disarmament is not open to discussion. In Palestine, the targeting of commanders in Gaza continues, figures point to the displacement of 488 families in Hebron, and demolition and raid operations persist in the West Bank. In Syria, a path of military capacity-building with Turkish support is taking shape, alongside a Jordanian strike in the south 'in coordination with the Syrian government', Israeli shelling in Quneitra countryside, an explosion on the Damascus–Homs road, and internal shifts in Homs and Tel Abyad.

Developments in the five countries are organised around one axis: the timing of a possible confrontation with Iran and the conditions for avoiding it. US and Israeli military indicators — from the repositioning of destroyers and the transfer of defence systems to Israel to the Israeli chief of staff's discussions with CENTCOM on strike preparations — intersect with talk of a campaign likely after the US midterms, and with a US message to Israel that it has an 'upcoming campaign' in Iran. Yet this track is intertwined with two domestic variables. The first is Israeli: the electoral split, falling shekel and equities, and the ambiguity over a caretaker government's authority to decide on war constrain timing, even as Netanyahu calls for a 'national government' and presents a 'historic' opportunity with Washington to remove the Iranian threat. The second is Iranian: Tehran uses diplomacy through regional mediators to delay a strike, while brandishing asymmetric retaliation tools including undersea cables, and meanwhile invests in rebuilding its proxies. Here the Iran file connects directly to Lebanon: reports of Iranian funding for Hezbollah's reconstruction, explosives purchasing and drone production, and Israeli reports of readiness to open the Lebanon front if war with Iran resumes, against Hezbollah's hardening on its weapons file and its refusal to discuss them, and US pressure on Beirut including sanctions threats and financial measures such as revoking Bank Saderat's licence. Added to this is the 'framework agreement' linking Israeli withdrawal to Hezbollah's disarmament and the army's deployment, whose political legitimacy is contested after Walid Jumblatt's remarks and which remains stalled by Israeli violations, according to President Aoun. In Syria a parallel dynamic is visible: military capacity-building under Turkish cover that Israel views as a future threat, a Jordanian strike in the south showing multiple intervening actors, and repeated Israeli shelling in Quneitra reflecting a desire to impose facts in southern Syria. In Palestine, the file appears tied to Israel's internal context: continued assassinations in Gaza, displacement in Hebron, and statements attributed to Smotrich about settlements in Gaza all reflect the impact of electoral shifts on the day-after trajectory. The shared regional linkage is therefore that the diplomatic track with Iran directly or indirectly sets the pace of escalation in Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, and any breakthrough or collapse in that track will immediately register on the subsidiary fronts.

Three main scenarios are plausible for the coming period. First: avoiding confrontation through an interim deal that brings in inspectors, eases some sanctions and releases part of frozen funds — a path backed by Qatari, Saudi, Egyptian and Pakistani mediation and Gulf pressure against haste; its realisation would bring relative calm in Lebanon and Syria and possibly Gaza. Second: a limited or intense US–Israeli military campaign after the midterms targeting leadership, energy facilities and nuclear infrastructure — a scenario reinforced by readiness and force-posture indicators; in that case, spillover into the Lebanese front through Hezbollah and into Syria through additional Israeli strikes would be likely. Third: continuation of the 'no war, no peace' state with low-intensity escalation: assassinations in Gaza, violations in southern Lebanon, exchange of strikes in Syria, and US-managed pressure on Beirut without resolution. The timing variable remains tied to two factors: the completion of Israeli government formation or continued political deadlock, and the Iranian leadership's position on a settlement. Indicators to watch include: the count of double envelopes and coalition formation in Israel, the outcome of mediation on inspectors, the fate of UNIFIL after 31 December 2026, the pace of Israeli operations in southern Syria, and the prosecution decision in the Dahieh explosives file.