Situation assessment

South Lebanon is witnessing sustained Israeli escalation: airstrikes, artillery fire and illumination bombs hit Kfar Tibnit, Braashit, Wadi al-Hujayr, Khiam, the Marjayoun plain, Nabatieh al-Fawqa and the outskirts of Qantara and Bani Hayyan, alongside demolition and arson of homes in Houla and Zawtar al-Sharqiya, the explosion of two drones over Mansouri, and two young men entering occupied Qantara on foot. In parallel, attention is focused on the fate of UNIFIL, with sources speaking of its operations ending on 31 December 2026 and a negative atmosphere ahead of a possible Security Council meeting in mid-November, while President Joseph Aoun insists Lebanon is committed to the mission's continuation or to finding a European alternative. US pressure on Beirut over Hezbollah and the Daher al-Baydar explosives file continues, with threats of sanctions, while the judicial file approaches the indictment stage after seven names appeared in the investigation and two people were detained. Conversely, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem stressed that the resistance continues and rejected any discussion of disarming it, describing the Iranian-American memorandum of understanding as a source of strength, while reports said the party is rebuilding its military capabilities, purchasing explosives and producing drones. Domestically, the four Lebanese Forces ministers are boycotting the cabinet session, Walid Jumblatt renewed his call for dialogue with Hezbollah and Iran while questioning the legitimacy of the "tripartite framework" with Israel, the Maronite Patriarch warned against land sales, and Banque du Liban revoked Bank Saderat's license.

Three simultaneous pressure tracks intersect in the Lebanese file, making ostensibly disparate events fundamentally interconnected. The first is security-Israeli: operations in the south are presented in Israeli reports as preventive measures to prevent Hezbollah from restoring its leadership and field structures, and come at a time when sources speak of Israeli readiness to open the Lebanon front if confrontation with Iran resumes, meaning the current escalation may be preparation or a test rather than an isolated event. The second is American-judicial: the apparent linkage between the Daher al-Baydar file and pressure on the government to implement the 2 March 2026 decision banning the party's military activities suggests Washington treats the judicial file as a test of political will, especially amid talk of US anger over Saudi intervention that delayed referral to the Judicial Council, and threats of sanctions that could reach political and security figures. The third concerns UNIFIL's fate: reports conflict between talk of a decision to end the mission at the end of 2026 under a negative atmosphere, and talk of Israeli rejection and US opposition to ending the mission — a contradiction that is itself an indicator that the file has become an external bargaining chip rather than a technical decision, and that the Lebanese presidency's pursuit of a European alternative reflects awareness of the risk of a potential security vacuum on the border. Hezbollah, for its part, offers a dual discourse: public adherence to the resistance and rejection of disarmament, against assurances conveyed through the Speaker of Parliament to the presidency that it will not engage in a new "support" front for Iran — assurances questioned by a ministerial source, reflecting the absence of official Lebanese certainty about the actual independence of the party's decision. A direct Iranian factor is added by the revocation of Bank Saderat's license, a financial measure read as pressure on the financial channel linked to Iran in Lebanon. Domestically, the boycott by the Lebanese Forces ministers weakens the government's ability to take decisive decisions on the weapons and budget files, while Jumblatt re-proposes dialogue as an alternative to confrontation, questioning the legitimacy of the "tripartite framework" on the grounds that neither parliament nor cabinet was consulted — a debate that shifts the discussion from the agreement's content to the legitimacy of its track. The Israeli elections remain a variable of anticipation rather than a bet, with official and party readings converging that the results will not fundamentally alter Israel's approach toward the south.

Based on the available data, three likely tracks emerge for the coming period. First, on the southern front: selective Israeli pressure through airstrikes, detonations and demolitions is likely to continue at a fluctuating pace, irrespective of the Israeli election results, as long as Israeli reports consider Hezbollah's reconstruction of its capabilities a justification for operations; the possibility of a broader escalation remains tied to the scenario of renewed confrontation with Iran, which Israeli and Lebanese sources discuss without resolution. Second, on the UNIFIL file: the possible Security Council meeting in mid-November is expected to be a revealing juncture, with two possibilities: an extension or a transitional arrangement preserving an international presence, or an actual withdrawal at the end of 2026 opening a border vacuum — a prospect the Lebanese presidency is trying to hedge against through the European alternative. Third, on the judicial-political file: if the indictment in the Daher al-Baydar case is issued on the expected timing, it could open a confrontation between the judiciary and the political leadership and become a gateway for implementing US sanctions threats, with Hezbollah reactions that cannot be measured in advance. Domestically, governmental paralysis is likely to persist due to the boycott, limiting Beirut's ability to deliver the practical steps Washington demands. Regarding the Iranian scenario, mutual assurances that Hezbollah will not engage in a new support war remain questioned, leaving Lebanon exposed to any sudden regional development.