Situation assessment

Over the past 72 hours, the Iranian file dominated the regional landscape: Washington and Tel Aviv raised the level of threat, with reports of plans for an intense military operation that could be carried out after the US congressional elections on 3 November, while Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared that the goal has become toppling the regime in Iran. Tehran, for its part, affirmed its rejection of concessions and spoke of a "state of war", with the Revolutionary Guard announcing that seven ships were hit in the Gulf near the Strait of Hormuz, and the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council linking the reopening of the strait to the implementation of seven conditions. In Lebanon, the government stressed that weapons are exclusively in the hands of the state and legitimate institutions, and referred the explosives shipment file to the judiciary, while Lebanese-Israeli meetings in Florida/Tampa ended without a breakthrough due to disagreement over the verification mechanism for removing Hezbollah's weapons and the observer states, coinciding with an Israeli military escalation on the ground in the south that included airstrikes, artillery shelling and incursions with Merkava tanks. In Gaza, airstrikes and assassinations continued, with Israeli reports of a gradual recovery of Hamas's capabilities and the rehabilitation of tunnels, and warnings that fuel for hospital generators has run out. In Syria, Israeli incursions in the Daraa countryside continued with the killing of a civilian, accompanied by US envoy Tom Barrack's call for a non-aggression agreement paving the way for normalization, amid reports of moves to establish an Israeli base in Jabal al-Arab. At the level of alliances, information emerged about Israeli-Saudi intelligence cooperation mediated by the United States in Yemen, alongside talk of a "Mecca alliance" and a "Badr defense pact".

Developments across the five countries are connected by a single organizing thread: the Iranian file, which functions as the region's distribution hub for tension. US-Israeli escalation toward Tehran casts a direct shadow over the subsidiary fronts. In Lebanon, the question of disarming Hezbollah is being pursued through a US-sponsored negotiation track that has stalled over the verification mechanism and observer states—a dispute inseparable from Israel's insistence on linking south Lebanon arrangements to the trajectory of the Iranian file. In Syria, the US call for a non-aggression agreement intersects with continued Israeli incursions in Daraa and Quneitra and talk of a base in Suwayda, suggesting Washington is trying to restrain the Israeli escalation track in Syria through an understanding formula, at a time when reports speak of Damascus's fear of a surprise move by Netanyahu before the elections. In Gaza, the data suggests Israel is managing an open file combining targeted assassinations with continuing operations, alongside an Israeli internal admission (Eisenkot's statements) that destroying Hamas's military capability has not been achieved—making the Gaza front a persistent factor in any upcoming regional arrangement. Added to this is the political timing factor: the Israeli elections on 27 October and the US midterms on 3 November. Military threats appear to be used as a bargaining chip and electoral pressure rather than an immediate decision, particularly given the opposition of senior Israeli military officials to striking Iran before the elections and their description of the fighter-jet sortie toward the Iranian border as "routine". The divergence in narratives on the timing of war and in the characterization of US visits also reflects the existence of more than one decision-making center. At the level of shared actors, roles are distributed among Washington (mediation and restraint), Qatar, France and Pakistan (mediation with Iran), Turkey and Saudi Arabia (parallel regional arrangements), and Israel, which links the fronts within a multi-front scenario extending to Yemen and Iraq. Conversely, contours of regional realignment are emerging through the "Mecca alliance", the "Badr defense pact", and Israeli-Saudi cooperation on the Houthis, reflecting a shift in the architecture of alliances that transcends the Palestinian file as a central priority. Across all these tracks, the absence of agreed verification mechanisms and the approaching end of UNIFIL's mandate on 31 December 2026 remain two additional factors of fragility in south Lebanon.

Three main scenarios can be identified for the coming period. First, continued escalation management without a full-scale explosion, with military threats used as leverage until after the two electoral milestones, while diplomatic tracks (Florida/Tampa for Lebanon, Qatari, French and Pakistani mediation with Iran, Barrack's moves on Syria) remain open but without a breakthrough. Second, a limited or intense military strike against Iran after 3 November, consistent with reports of three-day plans targeting nuclear facilities, energy infrastructure, missiles and drones—a scenario favored by Israeli officials but not enjoying consensus within the military establishment. Third, a shift of tension to a broader regional level if Tehran responds to any strike through the strait or through its proxies, especially given its declaration that US and Israeli interests will be legitimate targets and its threat to internet cables, data centers and Gulf energy facilities. On the Lebanese front, limited Israeli ground escalation in the south is likely to continue amid the stalled verification track, with a widening security vacuum probable as UNIFIL's mandate nears its end and Washington adopts Israel's position rejecting its continuation. In Syria, Israeli incursions in the south are likely to continue in the absence of an understanding, while the US track for an understanding remains a parallel option. As for Gaza, localized operations and a worsening humanitarian situation are expected, with the health ministry warning of fuel running out, and no clear horizon for disarmament. In the West Bank, the decision to expand gun licenses to settlements and the debate over annexation point to a potential rise in tension, despite the declared US position rejecting annexation.