Situation assessment

News over the past 72 hours shows Lebanon under dual pressure. On one hand, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam stressed in a Cabinet session that the monopoly on arms is a foundation of the state and that there is no partner to the state in decisions of war and peace, specifying that only the army, Internal Security Forces, General Security, State Security, Customs, and municipal police may bear arms. This coincided with follow-up on the explosives shipment seized on the 8th of this month while being transported toward Beirut, the possibility of referring it to the Judicial Council, and conflicting reports over arrest warrants for two Hezbollah officials, while Hezbollah acknowledged that the shipment belongs to the resistance. On the other hand, Lebanese-Israeli military meetings in Florida/Tampa ended without a declared breakthrough, with a fundamental dispute over the verification mechanism for removing Hezbollah's weapons and the monitoring states: Lebanon insists on an independent international mechanism, while Israel rejects that and insists on participating in monitoring. At the same time, the Israeli army continues air strikes, artillery shelling, incursions, and tank movements in southern Lebanon, with threats by Defense Minister Israel Katz to expand operations toward Nabatieh and the Litani River and to strike Beirut's southern suburbs, linking withdrawal to Hezbollah's disarmament. UNIFIL's mandate is approaching its end on December 31, 2026, amid reports of U.S. support for Israel's rejection of its continuation, and Qatari, Iranian, French, and Arab diplomatic activity over the future of the south. Economically, Salam announced progress in talks with Qatar over an offer to address the electricity crisis, while the Constitutional Council's decision on the bank reform law and financial gap controls, banks' objection to adjusting tax declarations, and an international arbitration case with an Emirati investor raised questions about the financial reform path.

The picture reflects the Lebanese authorities' attempt to translate diplomatic and security momentum into a clear sovereign framework by emphasizing the state's monopoly on arms, pursuing any weapons outside legitimate institutions, and linking this to the explosives shipment file as a test of the state's ability to impose its decision. But this path faces practical constraints: Hezbollah remains committed to its weapons and refuses discussion of limiting them, and its acknowledgment that the shipment belongs to the resistance places the government between public firmness and managing internal tension. The Florida/Tampa talks revolve around security arrangements and monitoring of weapons removal, but the dispute over the verification mechanism and monitoring states shows that the core obstacle is not merely technical; it concerns sequencing. Lebanon wants an end to occupation and Israeli withdrawal linked to addressing weapons, while Israel wants disarmament first or verification guarantees in which it participates, insisting it will not withdraw before that. The Israeli military escalation accompanying the talks, including strikes, incursions, and threats to expand operations, is used as negotiating pressure and a tool to impose security facts on the ground, making any technical understanding fragile. In the background, UNIFIL's approaching end removes a UN barrier that limited friction, amid reports that Washington adopts Israel's position rejecting its continuation, increasing the burden on the Lebanese army and deepening fears of a security and economic vacuum in the south. Domestically, official positions appear close on ending the occupation and the need to confine arms to the state, but differ on the sequencing of implementation and the method of pressuring Hezbollah, while political forces such as the Free Patriotic Movement try to propose a parallel formula linking an end to occupation with confining arms. Economically, the Qatari electricity file may provide a practical entry point to ease the crisis and strengthen Doha's role, but it alone will not resolve the public finance crisis; the Constitutional Council's decision on the financial gap and banks' objection to taxes complicate reform and IMF negotiations, to which is added the risk of international arbitration.

Based on current data, the trajectory of technical military talks between Lebanon and Israel is likely to continue without a comprehensive breakthrough, with the dispute over verification and withdrawal remaining central. Limited or intermittent Israeli military escalation in the south is also likely to continue as leverage, with the risk of broader escalation if Israel perceives a violation, firing, or a link to an Iranian attack, especially given Katz's threats regarding Nabatieh, the Litani, and the southern suburbs. The possibility of a partial arrangement appears possible but remains tied to compromises over international monitoring and withdrawal from specific positions, not to a comprehensive solution on the weapons file. As UNIFIL's mandate nears its end in late 2026, questions over alternative security arrangements are expected to increase, with additional pressure on the Lebanese army and economic and employment losses in the south. Economically, the electricity track with Qatar may advance if financing and legal arrangements are overcome, but the financial gap, banks, and IMF file remain candidates for delay or confrontation unless the government, banks, and Parliament agree on an acceptable legal formula.