Situation assessment

The past 72 hours witnessed the most intense escalation in the US-Iranian confrontation: Washington struck the Konarak naval base in Sistan and Baluchestan, the IRGC Navy declared the Strait of Hormuz "closed" and threatened to burn violating ships, with 12 attacks on shipping recorded, two cargo vessels sunk and crude prices remaining above $100, while the Houthis targeted a Saudi tanker in Bab al-Mandab and Riyadh airport. Against Israeli threats of harsher strikes, Tehran expanded its target list and warned of a "harsher" response, while Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Tehran offering mediation, and US President Donald Trump said the situation was "very positive" and that Washington might "finish the mission soon," declaring his full support for Benjamin Netanyahu. In Israel, eight days before the 27 October elections, Netanyahu announced a "security doctrine" prioritizing preemptive attack over containment, Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir raised alert to the maximum level, barred soldiers from leaving their units and reinforced forces in the West Bank, while a reserve general said "a few weeks" separate Israel from another military campaign in Iran. On the Lebanese front, Israeli strikes continued on Baraachit, Kafr Tibnit and Wadi al-Hujayr alongside a tank incursion in Kafr Shuba, a Lebanese-Israeli negotiating round in Tampa with no expected breakthrough, and international concern over a security vacuum after UNIFIL's mandate ends, against a Qatari plan for two power plants of 1,650 MW and a two-decade gas supply via Syria. In Gaza strikes continued despite the ceasefire, in the West Bank settler violence escalated against an American journalist, a French mayor and European diplomats, while Israel acknowledged transferring Syrian detainees to facilities inside Israel and 280 incursion incidents were recorded in southern Syria during September.

The US-Iranian confrontation is the axis around which the rest of the regional developments are shaped. Tehran's declaration of Hormuz's closure, its threat to target internet cables and new targets, and the Houthi strikes on a Saudi tanker and Riyadh airport all express an Iranian strategy that relies on maritime and proxy fronts to raise the cost of pressure on it; in this context comes the arrival in Beirut of IRGC commander Hossein Yekta with directives to strengthen coordination among "axis of resistance" parties in Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen, reflecting Tehran's attempt to consolidate its fronts ahead of any wider confrontation. For Israel, the war's timing intersects with a decisive electoral moment: the new security doctrine prioritizing a preemptive strike on Iran even without coordination with Washington, the raising of alert and the ban on soldiers leaving units, and the reserve general's statement that "a few weeks" separate Israel from another campaign are all indicators that the Israeli decision window is postponed until after 27 October, which also explains the postponement of opening the E1 project tender to 19 November. In Lebanon, three tracks intersect: continuous Israeli military pressure through strikes and incursions, a fragile diplomatic track in Tampa from which Beirut expects no tangible results, and an internal crisis over Hezbollah's weapons reflected in the seizure of an explosives shipment bound for the southern suburbs and President Joseph Aoun's emphasis on preventing armed displays, with Hezbollah, through MP Mohammad Raad, refusing to discuss any arrangements before acknowledging the "right of resistance"; added to this is the risk of a security vacuum as UNIFIL's mandate approaches its end on 31 December, a concern raised by the Arab League and France. In Syria, the security track with Israel appears frozen since March because of the war on Iran, which explains continued incursions in Quneitra and Daraa, and Netanyahu's disclosure of a call with President Ahmed al-Sharaa in July 2025 without Damascus confirming it, while Israel continues to hold Syrians in facilities inside Israel. In Palestine, a Western divergence from Israel is noticeable: American, European and British condemnations of settler violence and London's threat of sanctions over the E1 project, a divergence that does not affect coordination on Iran but narrows Israel's diplomatic margin. Lavrov's visit shows Russia seeking a mediator's role in managing the Hormuz crisis, while the Qatari plan for Lebanon and Syria introduces a Gulf economic dimension that could rearrange the regional energy map away from Iranian influence.

The data suggest three overlapping scenarios. First, the continuation of the US-Iranian war with Hormuz remaining restricted or closed and continued Houthi pressure on Bab al-Mandab, keeping energy prices high and widening maritime risk. Second, a gradual negotiating track led by Moscow around a proposal to reopen Hormuz within seven days in exchange for understandings on the siege, sanctions and the nuclear file — a track given practical weight by American statements about "finishing the mission soon," but which remains fragile given both sides' threats. Third, and most relevant to the region, Israeli election results after 27 October being translated into an executive decision: either a new campaign in Iran, as Israeli military assessments suggest, or a broader escalation on the Lebanese front, where strikes are already ongoing, with the possibility that such a step coincides with a security vacuum in southern Lebanon after UNIFIL's mandate ends. In Syria, continued security stalemate and limited incursions are likely unless a broader regional understanding emerges after the war. In Palestine, settler violence is expected to escalate during the olive harvest season amid growing Western pressure, without that translating into a change in the course of military operations in Gaza.