Situation assessment

Over the past 72 hours, Lebanon has witnessed continued Israeli escalation in the south, including airstrikes on Braasheet, Kafr Tebnit, Wadi al-Hujeir, Khiam and other areas, a ground incursion with tanks into Kafr Shuba, house searches and the abduction of citizens, alongside explicit threats by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to withdraw from the security belt as long as Hezbollah retains its weapons. Domestically, the issue of the explosives shipment seized at the Dhahr al-Baydar checkpoint, which Hezbollah has acknowledged owning, has dominated the political and security scene, with an expanded investigation, a security meeting chaired by President Joseph Aoun stressing the prevention of armed displays and the confiscation of weapons, and the Galerie Semaan incident. In parallel, Arab, French and US diplomatic contacts continue regarding the Lebanese-Israeli talks in Tampa and post-UNIFIL arrangements, along with a Qatari plan to build two power plants and supply gas. Iranian and Syrian moves related to Lebanon have also emerged, from a visit by an IRGC commander to Beirut to Lebanon asking Tehran to stop supplying Hezbollah with weapons and money.

Current dynamics reflect a multi-tool Israeli pressure campaign: military operations in the south, incursions and abductions, and threats not to withdraw, aimed at keeping Hezbollah under attrition and preventing its repositioning, while linking any security arrangement to its disarmament. Hezbollah, for its part, appears to be avoiding a full-scale confrontation for now, as suggested by its description of the Lebanese Army’s deployment in the southern suburbs as normal, though it warns against punitive measures and insists on the legitimacy of its weapons, making any move against them a trigger for escalation. The Lebanese state has placed itself before a test of its authority through the explosives file, which could expand judicially and politically and place the government between US and Israeli pressure to dismantle Hezbollah’s capabilities and fears of internal explosion. Reports indicate that Washington is testing the state’s seriousness on the weapons and explosives files and demanding the drying up of Hezbollah’s funding, the dismantling of its structure and direct security coordination with Israel, which goes far beyond the government’s declared commitment to a diplomatic solution and full Israeli withdrawal. On UNIFIL, Lebanese, Arab and French concern about a security vacuum after 31 December 2026 intersects with a strict US position rejecting extension and demanding the dismantling of the force’s facilities, leaving southern Lebanon before an unresolved transitional scenario. The Qatari electricity and gas plan constitutes a potential positive economic entry point, but it is long-term and linked to the security of the Arab Gas Pipeline through Syria and to field stability. On the Iranian track, the visit of an IRGC commander to Beirut and his coordination meetings suggest that Tehran is preparing its allies for a possible renewed confrontation, while the Lebanese foreign minister’s call in Baghdad on Tehran to stop supplying Hezbollah with weapons and money reflects a Lebanese attempt to demonstrate sovereignty and balance pressures. The Syrian file adds another layer of complexity, between the handover of a new batch of Syrian prisoners and Damascus’s assertion of non-interference, and a controversial abduction and arrest that touches Lebanese sovereignty.

Based on the available data, the Tampa talks appear unlikely to produce a tangible breakthrough, with Israel continuing its field and political pressure and linking any withdrawal to Hezbollah’s disarmament. Airstrikes and limited incursions in the south are likely to continue, with the risk of a broader escalation if Hezbollah responds to qualitative operations or if US-Iranian tension worsens. Domestically, the explosives investigation is expected to expand and further judicial and security measures to be taken, while the risk of armed friction remains but with attempts by both sides to contain the situation. The UNIFIL file will see intensive diplomacy before the mandate ends, and if no alternative mechanism is agreed by 31 December 2026, the likelihood of a security vacuum and heightened confrontation risk will increase, especially given reports of a Turkish military presence in the south that Israel opposes. Economically, the Qatari plan may enter a phased implementation stage, but its effect on the electricity crisis will not be immediate.