Situation assessment

The news accumulated over the past 72 hours indicates that the region is in a 'no war, no settlement' phase centered on the Iranian file. While US President Donald Trump declared that Iran is 'militarily finished' and that there is 'positive momentum' toward ending the war, Iranian officials denied the existence of talks and stressed that any agreement would only materialize on Iranian conditions. The Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Mohsen Rezaei, said the nuclear file is not currently on the table, rejected transferring enriched uranium abroad, and threatened to strike US bases in Europe. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the US naval blockade continued, with the G7 condemning Iranian attacks on civilian ships and reports that Qatar obtained a two-week window to prevent a US attack. In parallel, the Israeli Cabinet directed the military to raise its readiness for a possible attack on Iran amid internal divisions and disagreements between Netanyahu and the Chief of Staff, while the army awaits the formation of a new government to present a plan for reducing forces in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. On the ground, Israel continued its strikes on southern Lebanese villages even during Naim Qassem's speech, and its artillery shelling and incursions in the Quneitra and Daraa countryside and the Damascus countryside, while the Gaza Strip witnessed a humanitarian catastrophe with about 70,000 tents flooded and a sandbank collapse killing five people, including three children, alongside strikes targeting Nasser Hospital, al-Tuffah, and Sheikh Radwan. In Lebanon, security investigations continue into the 'Jurd cell' and the killing of former Iraqi MP Ahmed al-Alwani, amid a severe economic and living crisis and IMF negotiations over $80 billion in deposits.

Three interrelated axes explain the current regional picture. The first is the US-Iranian-Israeli triangle that sets the region's tempo: Washington, according to Axios, is choosing a 'third option' based on economic pressure and naval blockade instead of military escalation or an agreement, while Tehran refuses to negotiate the nuclear file and conditions the opening of Hormuz on the implementation of 'seven conditions,' keeping open the threat to target US bases. In contrast, the Israeli Cabinet is raising readiness for a possible attack, Israeli lawmakers are proposing strikes on Iran's oil and electricity infrastructure, and there is talk of Israel preparing to confront Iran alone amid a declining US role. This intersection of US pressure, Israeli threats, and Iranian intransigence makes any miscalculation capable of igniting a full-scale confrontation, especially with the Cabinet meeting on Sunday approaching and Qatar's deadline expiring. The second axis is Lebanon and Syria as low-intensity pressure arenas: Israeli strikes on Hadata, Mansouri, Braashit, and Bani Hayyan coincided with Naim Qassem's speech, in which he linked any discussion of Hezbollah's weapons to Israeli withdrawal and an end to 'guardianship,' meaning the weapons file will remain suspended and the confrontation ground open. In Syria, Israeli incursions in Quneitra and Daraa and shelling of Beit Jinn and the Mantara dam continue, with Damascus accusing Israel of undermining the 1974 agreement, reflecting the use of southern Syria as a persistent pressure card. A Lebanese-Syrian security link also emerges through the uncovering of a network smuggling 200,000 narcotic pills, the release of prisoners Damascus received from Lebanon, and Lebanese-Iraqi coordination in the Alwani case. The third axis is Gaza, where Israel's conduct of the war collides with a catastrophic humanitarian crisis: the Israeli army demands that Hamas disarm, Netanyahu's office insists it has 'not handed over a single weapon,' while tents are flooded, sandbanks collapse, and hospitals are targeted, amid UNICEF warnings and calls from the Arab League and the G7. Israel's internal variable — Eisenkot being tasked with forming a government, Netanyahu's threat to dissolve the Knesset, and the division over his speech — remains a factor determining the pace of any escalation or calm in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran.

Regional expectations fall into three scenarios. The first, currently the most likely, is the continuation of the 'third path': US economic pressure and naval blockade in Hormuz, with limited Israeli strikes in Lebanon and Syria and intermittent targeting in Gaza, without a full-scale war, pending the outcome of Qatar's deadline and the formation of the Israeli government. The second is limited or broader military escalation if Qatari diplomacy fails or Israel decides to strike Iranian infrastructure alone, which could open simultaneous fronts in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and the Strait of Hormuz. The third is a partial settlement based on a phased exchange: lifting the naval blockade in return for nuclear restrictions, a scenario hampered by Iran's seven conditions and US internal divisions. In Lebanon, deadlock over Hezbollah's weapons is likely to persist as long as the link to Israeli withdrawal remains, with a possible return of the Lebanese Forces ministers to the government through an electricity settlement. In Syria, limited Israeli incursions in the south are expected to continue. In Gaza, humanitarian risks will grow with the onset of winter and the continuing dispute over disarming Hamas. The most important variable remains the identity of the next Israeli government and its commitment to the force-reduction plan or to escalation.