Situation assessment

Over the past 72 hours, the regional dynamic has centered on US–Iranian escalation in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, with US President Donald Trump announcing 'limited strikes' in Iran and Washington's control of the Strait, while Iran denied being subjected to US strikes and the IRGC announced the closure of the Strait to 'violating ships' after two oil tankers collided with mines and caught fire. This coincided with Qatari mediation efforts and US options ranging from strikes to economic pressure to a deal, alongside pressure on Iraq to close most of its border crossings with Iran. In Israel, President Isaac Herzog tasked Benny Eisenkot with forming the government, while security discussions continued about a new round against Iran and heightened alert. On the Lebanese front, the Israeli army continued its raids, shelling, demolitions and incursions in the south, and its Northern Command announced a new wave of attacks, amid Lebanese concern about being drawn into a regional confrontation and internal debate over Hezbollah's weapons, the Daher al-Baydar explosives file, and international calls for the state to monopolize arms. In Gaza, reconstruction remained conditional on progress in disarming Hamas, with a humanitarian catastrophe caused by the flooding of displaced people's tents, while the Palestinian leadership pursued diplomacy at the United Nations against the Israeli presence in the West Bank. In Syria, Damascus signed a military cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia and denied sending forces to Yemen, while Israeli attacks continued in the Quneitra and Daraa countryside.

A single connecting thread runs through these developments: the Iran file is the axis reshaping the fronts. The United States is combining declared military pressure in Hormuz, economic pressure through Iraq, and a Qatari mediation window involving reciprocal steps including lifting the naval blockade, releasing part of frozen funds, and resuming inspectors' work. This mix of 'coercive diplomacy' is pushing Iran to raise the ceiling of its military messaging, including the IRGC's announcement that it is lifting restrictions on the range of its ballistic missiles and closing the Strait, increasing the risk of miscalculation. In Israel, the Iran file intersects with internal political transition: Eisenkot's tasking to form a government, talk of a national emergency government, a Mossad–army dispute over the timing and nature of any operation against Iran, and controversy over the suspension of US aid. Reports that Netanyahu planned to strike Iran before the elections and that Washington blocked it show that war decisions are affected by Israeli political calculations and US pressure. On the Lebanese front, Lebanon appears as the most exposed arena: Israeli raids continue, the Northern Command speaks of a new wave of attacks, and Defense Minister Israel Katz warns Hezbollah of severe strikes if it joins an Iranian attack, while Lebanon faces confusion over Hezbollah's commitment to the state decision to keep the country out of the war. The Syrian front is linked to this framework through Damascus's attempt to stay out by means of military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and its denial of sending forces to Yemen, but Israeli strikes in the Quneitra and Daraa countryside and flights over Damascus keep Syria exposed. In Gaza, the US reconstruction plan is read as part of the broader regional arrangement: Washington links it to progress on disarming Hamas, Trump wants to implement the peace plan regardless of whether Netanyahu remains in power, while Hamas demands that mediators, guarantors and the Peace Council pressure Israel to implement the humanitarian protocol. The humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza overlaps with Palestinian diplomatic action at the United Nations against settlements and the Israeli presence in the West Bank, including condemnation of E1 tenders and the Golan. Overall, common actors — Washington, Tehran, Israel, Hezbollah, Hamas, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iraq, Syria and the United Nations — are managing escalation and negotiation tracks simultaneously, making the fronts interconnected: any development in Hormuz is reflected in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, and any progress or deadlock in Gaza affects Israeli political legitimacy and US priority-setting.

Three scenarios can be outlined for the coming period. First: conditional de-escalation if Qatari mediation succeeds in reciprocal steps including lifting the naval blockade, releasing part of frozen funds, inviting IAEA inspectors, then reopening the Strait of Hormuz and resuming nuclear talks; this path would ease pressure on the Lebanese, Syrian and Iraqi fronts. Second: a round of limited US–Israeli strikes against Iran, with an Iranian response in Hormuz or through multiple fronts, raising the risk of Lebanon, Syria and Iraq being drawn into confrontation, especially given Israeli talk of a possible third wave and an offensive plan against Hezbollah if it becomes involved. Third: expansion of the conflict if the Strait closure continues, tanker incidents recur, Hezbollah decides to join, or humanitarian arrangements in Gaza collapse. In Gaza, continued suspension of reconstruction appears likely unless progress is made on disarming Hamas, with the humanitarian crisis worsening in winter and Palestinian moves at the United Nations continuing. In Lebanon, Israeli pressure and raids are expected to continue, alongside international pressure for the state to monopolize arms, with attention to the direction of the new Israeli government. In Syria, Damascus is likely to continue balancing its Saudi relations by trying to stay out of the Yemen war and the Iranian–Israeli confrontation, but southern Syria will remain exposed to Israeli strikes, while reopening the Daboussieh crossing with Lebanon may ease some border bottlenecks.